







Airline Business ModelsFSNCs, LCCs, ULCCs and Charter Carriers

Istanbul Technical University

Air Transportation Management, M.Sc. Program

Aviation Economics and Financial Analysis

Module 8

November 12, 2014

Outline



Economic characteristics of

- •FSNCs
- •LCCs
- •ULCCs
- Charter

Cost structure of the different carrier types Market impact of LCCs/FSNCs FSNCs versus LCCs Future of LCCs/FSNCs

Evolution

Before deregulation

- •Full service network carriers
- •Significant number of charter carriers
- No low cost models
- •No price competition (same price on a given route)
- •Full-quality service
- Point-to-point route networks



Evolution – cont.

After deregulation

- Proliferation of LCC models
- •Hybrid carriers
- Industry consolidation (mergers and acquisitions)
- Alliances and joint ventures
- Service debundling
- Hub-and-spoke route systems



Realizing the

Hub and spoke route network




Hub and spoke - route network structure by which a carrier utilizes an airport to route a broad range of Origin & Destination markets.

•Hub = Central node or airport

•Spoke = Nonstop routes radiating out from the hub connecting with various other markets


•E-D, A-B, C-B etc. O&D market is routed via hub; market cannot sustain frequent nonstop service




Realizing the vision together

Hub Structures















Hub Wave Pattern at FRA (LH)



LH OA




Hubs and traffic density



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
Linear Route

Each route supports 1 flight/dayAverage traffic density



Hub Route

- Each route supports 2 flights/day
- Average traffic density
- •2 flights/day per route
- Same or more total traffic as linear








Types of hubs

Simple hubs – little or no coordination between in- and outbound flights. Spokes scheduled independently.


•Complex hubs - flights are co-ordinated to arrive in "banks" (allow more and fast connections between flights but poor utilization outside banks and minimal interline traffic).



Bank Structure

Typical bank duration lasts between 1.5 hours and four hours

- Bank Duration (BDT) = Inbound Bank (BDI) + MCT + Outbound Bank (BDO)
- Extended banks (> 4 hours) produce many hits, but most are poorer quality (i.e. MCT minimization) QSI factors
- "Fast" connections (utilization-driven)
 - sacrifice breadth of connectivity
- "Many" connections (volume-driven)
- sacrifice efficiency, i.e. minimize MCTs



InterVISTAS



Types of hubs

Directional

•all arrivals from east, all departures to west

•E-W or N-S aligned spokes due to market, regulatory conditions


geographic constraints (i.e. Canada, CX)


Multiple (Omnidirectional)

- •Reflective of mature hub development
- •Broad domestic geographic network (i.e. U.S.)
- Geographic location with multiple International
 Destinations (e.g. THY and IST)

•Characteristic of all major U.S. carriers

Examples of Directional and Omni Hubs





Hub Wave Pattern at DXB (EK)

InterVISTAS

- EK's DXB hub is omni-directional and has a 3-wave pattern
 - **Omni-directional hubs are more** • commonly found in European, Gulf and Asian hub patterns and typically have 3-7 waves per day

- DL's DTW hub is bi-directional (east-west) and has a 9-wave pattern
- **Bi-directional hubs typically have** 6+ waves in their daily hub structure
- This type of structure is most commonly found in U.S. hubs




International

International & domestic networks co-ordinated

- •Carriers primary international gateway for that region
- •i.e. YVR (AC), SFO (UA), MIA (AA), IST (THY)
- •i.e. HKG (CX), AMS (KL) though no domestic networks

Realizing the vision together



Hub Wave Pattern at FRA by Region (LH)

Hub Wave Pattern at FRA (LH) – by Region





Three additional trip time components compared to nonstop flight:

•30 minutes for additional ascent/descent (stop) at hub airport

•Extra cruise time (depending on the angle)

•Connection time (30-60 minutes between flights)

Extra trip time offset by better total time for traveler:

•Total time = trip time + waiting time

•Wait time = Time from Desired Departure to Actual Departure

Overview of the hub design principles



Market forecast

Route growth

Frequency growth

Positive share gap markets

Airport constraints

Competitive strengths & weaknesses

Outputs Maximize hits (Connectivity) Maximize passenger flows (6th freedom)

Maximize yield, load factors, RASK

Minimize/acceptable delays


Optimize effective use of airport/airspace constraint

Reliable schedule (dependability)

Maximize aircraft utilization

Design process schedule is a generator of alternatives, and selection of the best fit. Ideally, this is a combination of different optimization tools

Selecting the Best Hub Structure Requires Defining Alternative competing hub structures and selection of the best structure that leads to the optimal outputs



InterVISTAS

Peer Hub Bank Time Comparison							
	AF @ CDG	LH @ FRA	EK @ DXB				
BDI	1.50	3.75	3.17				
BDO	1.57	3.88	3.50				
МСТ	1.00	0.75	0.75				
BDT	4.07	8.38	7.42				
# Banks	7	4	3				

Time penalties comparison



Linear:

•2 flights per day nonstop, 8 hours apart.

➔ average wait = 4 hours

Hub:

- •4 flights per day, but via hub
- 2 hours apart
- →average wait = 1 hour
- →+ 0.5 h ascent/descent
- →+ 0.5 h extra cruise
- →+ 0.5 h connection

→ total wait & incremental flight time = 2.5 hours



N cities in a hub network → N (N-1) / 2 potential city pairs

N	2	3	4	5	20	98
<u>N(N-1)</u> 2	1	3	6	10	190	4,743

Supporting a hub - total traffic needed to support an additional flight can be small

eg Airline has 200 destinations connecting to hub 1 passenger per destination could fill an aircraft



"Hubbing" keeps more traffic on-line (less interline)

Feeder links can be important - hubs led to the rise of extensive "commuter" or "regionals" aligned, contracted with or subsidiaries of major air carriers (e.g. AC Jazz)





Competition

Weather

especially for cargo hubs

Geographic location

Distance from the airline's other hubs

Local O&D market

Airport congestion

•groundside & air traffic

access to gates & facilities

room for future growth

community support

•Restrictions (e.g. night operations)

No of City Pairs within 40% circuitry

Criteria for evaluating hubs

InterVISTAS

Primary Hubs

Evaluation Criteria	Minimum Requirement
Intl O&D demand	>1.5 million annual pax in 2008
Dom O&D demand	>1.5 million annual pax in 2008
Good circuity for 6 th Freedom markets	>30 of top markets <130% circuity
Potential for strong presence	achieves ranking in top 2 by seat share
Apt capacity for hubbing	>40 gates available simultaneously

Secondary Hubs

Evaluation Criteria	Minimum Requirement
Regional O&D demand	>1 million annual pax in 2008
Dom O&D demand	>1 million annual pax in 2008
Good circuity for regional markets	>20 of top regional markets <130% circuity
Good circuity for domestic markets	>20 of top domestic markets <130% circuity
Apt capacity for hubbing	>20 gates available simultaneously

Apply criteria to hubs in India: Example



= Meets criteria


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Only BOM and DEL satisfy all of the criteria to be a Primary Hub

Delhi is geographically positioned to provide direct routings to the greatest number of *6th Freedom markets*, when compared to major hubs like Dubai and Singapore





Industry Challenges



A key source of fragility is increased competition from low cost carriers

Low Cost Carriers have redefined the industry and its economics.

 Air Canada has launched a new low cost model with their leisure focused Rouge.

 WestJet has launched a new regional service, *Encore.* Low cost carriers have redefined the airline product One-way versus return trips

Point-to-point versus hub-and-spoke route system

- Less connectivity
- .One type of aircraft
- Quicker to adjust capacity
- .Focus on what adds value, remove the rest
- Many have achieved high, consistent profitability

Next Generation Airline Business Model

The Internet effect

 Industries Profoundly Impacted by Internet Companies:

Music

•Video

- Newspapers
- Book publishing & retail
- Traditional Phone Companies
- •Big Box Electronics
- Income tax preparation
- Travel Agents
- Aviation

Google purchased travel software company ITA Software Inc

ITA powers Orbitz, Kayak, Cheap Tickets, AA, UA, Virgin, ANA and others



Google/Social Media/Visa Int'l: Re-packaging Airline Product?



Internet companies have potential to repackage airline products:

Kayak "hacker fares" create connections not available from carriers;

Google invested in airline res system;

Could develop platform to enter business directly;

Could offer value added packages for trip fulfillment:

Would you pay \$125 for guarantee that you will get to your destination today?

Internet creates new interline products

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-date interface design makes the system easy to learn and use. He explained. The platform this apparently callects personal information about travelers that in stored in a database to an artistic an perioralizo die senace il gives to customeno

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Whith ments the system is built to scale to page-t activity of all spec-





Automation

.90% of domestic AC passengers use kiosk, mobile check-in or automated bag-tag process

WestJet has approximately 85% of passengers check-in online or a kiosk

Ryanair charges fee if kiosk is not used

Amsterdam airport - fully automated bag drop function

Automated kiosks are playing a greater role

Automation & Check-In:

Mobile check-in and boarding passes have nearly replaced the traditional check-in process.

·Canada was a pioneer in self bag-tag.




WHEN PART &

Auckland, New Zealand











Legacy or full-service network carriers

- Low cost carriers (LCCs)
- **Ultra low cost carriers (ULCCs)**
- **Charter carriers**
- **Regional carriers**
- **Hybrid carriers**



Legacy carriers

Legacy carriers (or FSNCs)

- •Wide range of pre-flight and onboard services
- Multiple seat classes
- •Hub-and-spoke route systems

Still account for a large share of passenger traffic

•Larger market share in international routes

•Smaller in domestic markets (loss to LCCs)

Ownership (private, majority or minority stake owned by the government, multi-country)

Major airlines by the number of passengers carried



International		Domes	tic	Total (International + Domestic)		
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Major international cargo carriers

InterVISTAS	ľ

The world's busiest airline	s
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	Airline	FTK (millions)
1	FedEx	15,743
2	UPS Airlines	10,194
3	Cathay Pacific Airway	s 9,587
4	Korean Air Lines	9,542
5	Emirates	7,913
6	Lufthansa	7,428
7	Singapore Airlines	7,001
8	China Airlines	6,410
9	EVA Air	5,166
10	Cargolux	4,901

Inte	rnational F	TK (millions)
1	Cathay Pacific Airways	9,587
2	Korean Air	9,487
3	Emirates	7,913
4	Lufthansa	7,422
5	FedEx	7,421
6	Singapore Airlines	7,000
7	China Airlines	6,410
8	UPS Airlines	5,215
9	Eva Air	5,166
10	Cargolux	4,901

Profit vs Compensation



2010 Airline CEO Compensation vs. Earnings

Name	Airline	2010 Pay	2010 Earnings
Richard H. Anderson	Delta	\$8,041,271	\$593 million
Gerard J. Arpey	AMR	\$5,952,675	\$471 million (loss)
Jeffery Smisek	United Continental	\$4,359,766	\$253 million
Gary C. Kelly	Southwest	\$3,357,570	\$459 million
William S. Ayer	Alaska	\$3,357,350	\$251.1 million
W. Douglas Parker	US Airways	\$2,757,981	\$502 million
David Barger	Jetblue	\$1,226,017	\$097 million

Low cost carriers (LCCs)




"No, we shouldn't give you a bloody cup of coffee. We only charge 19 euros for the ticket"

Michael O'Leary, President of Ryanair

"When someone comes to me with a cost saving idea, I don't immediately jump up and say yes. I ask: what's the effect on the customer?"

Herb Kelleher, former CEO Southwest Airlines





LCCs

LCC differ from legacy carriers:

Do not offer 'frills'

Have point-to-point route systems as opposed to 'hubs'

Use simple fleet composition, typically one type of aircraft Non-unionized labour

US-based Southwest Airlines is a notable example of success with over 40 consecutive years of profitability

Ryanair is the most profitable passenger airline in Europe

Canada's LCC WestJet was modeled on Southwest

Low cost carriers have contributed to profit erosion of majors




Realizing the vision together

LCC business model



Major expansion of LCCs in the US, Canada, Europe, Australia, Asia and Latin America. Traditional LCC business model:

- •one type of aircraft
- •'no frills' product
- charge for 'ancillaries'
- price sensitive travellers
- high density routes
- high aircraft utilization
- secondary airports
- point-to-point route systems



LCC design



Product design (simplicity)

- Single class
- •Higher density seating
- No assigned seating (e.g., Southwest)
- · cheap and cheerful'

Process design (simplicity)

- Use of secondary airports
- Minimum turn-around time
- •High aircraft utilization
- No connections, interlining
- Short to medium haul routes (up to 750 miles)

With a banked schedule, minimum connect times drive turnaround times – not ground operations



(Carriers - 737-300) Cater Weight and Extend jetway and (15 min) Balance open door Inside (2 min) (1 min) Boarding Deplane 41-46 (10 min) min (13 min) Close door and jetway Clean cabin (1 min) (10-15 min) Close cargo Arrival door Dispatch (1 min) (2 min)(4 min) Fuel Prearrival Ramp (Outside) (10-15 min) Equipment Departure Set Up (2 Min) Ground power A/C 33-43 bin door min (3 min) Unload/load bags and cargo


Ground Operations – Required Time for a Turnaround

Opportunities To Compress Ground Operations' Turnaround Times

(20-30 min)

But, with a continuous schedule, ground operations drives InterVISTAS turnaround time, and thus airplane/crew utilization

Ground Operations – Required Time for a Turnaround




(Southwest – 737-300)

The LCCs Have Engineered Rapid Turnaround Processes emulated on short haul routes by network carriers

InterVISTAS

	HUB & SPOKE CARRIER	LOW-COST CARRIER
Model	Convenient <u>connecting</u> travel via hub	Efficient point-to-point (P2P) travel
Scheduling	Synchronized banks: – enable rapid connections – lower utilization of flight equipment/crews – uneven workload for ground crews	<i>Continuous flow</i> uses flight and ground resources efficiently (minimal down time and level-loading)
Turnarounds	Lengthy (65 min), due to the minimum connect times for passengers and bags	Minimized (25 – 30 min) key to high utilization of flight resources
Baggage Handling	 Schedule creates uneven work load Two parallel baggage-handling systems 	 Schedule creates level work load Simpler baggage-handling system
Passenger Handling	 Schedule creates uneven work load Intense re-work to maximize service to preferred pax (e.g., re-seating) 	 Schedule creates level work load Simpler process provides adequate customer service
Fuel	Banked schedule creates hub congestion that consumes extra fuel	Continuous schedule minimizes congestion, reducing fuel consumption
Objective	Heavy use of high-cost channels (GDS)	Heavy use of low-cost channels (direct)


LCC cost advantage



Source: CAPA Centre for Aviation (2010)

Mid 2000@s US LCCs had still a cost advantage of up to 37% over US network carriers






Operating Cost per ASK ^{1/}

1/ CY 2005.
 2/ American, Delta, United.

Source: IATA Airline Cost Performance Economics Briefing, March 2007.

LCCs cost advantage






Source: O'Connell (2008)


Southwest achieves 75% of its cost advantage through fuel hedging and product, distribution, and overhead cost savings





1/ CY 2005.
 2/ American, Delta, United.
 Source: IATA Airline Cost Performance Economics Briefing, March 2007.


JetBlue's cost savings are more evenly spread across all cost centers



Source: IATA Airline Cost Performance Economics Briefing, March 2007.

2/ American, Delta, United.

EasyJet has far less of a gap in infrastructure costs as it operates at more major airports than Ryanair




1/ CY 2005.

2/ Air France, British Airways, Lufthansa.

Source: IATA Airline Cost Performance Economics Briefing, March 2007.

Source: The Economist (2012)

LCCs profit margin







Large airfare reduction [Hof, Dresner & Windle (2004), Morrison & Winston (2003), Kim & Singal (1993), Borenstein (1990, 1992)]


•Network carriers reduced average airfares by 35-40%

Huge expansion of stimulated demand as well as passengers attracted from adjacent airports thus dramatic increase in travelers at LCC airports

Network carriers' hub premiums decreased significantly when one or more LCCs are present at the hub


LCC expansion globally is a continued driving source of growth






Current status of LCCs






LCCs in North America





Southwest Airlines






Source: Southwest Airlines

Impact on fares before and after Southwest entry




In top 10 Philadelphia markets



Impact on traffic before and after Southwest entry



In top 10 Philadelphia markets



19 November 2013


Realizing the vision together

Trends:

 Increased LCC penetration

LCCs in Europe

- LCC subsidies (lower airport landing fees)
- Ryanair allegedly benefited from 660 million EURO in subsidies










F			

LCCs quickly gain domestic market share in Asia



Source: CAPA as quoted by Airline Leader (2012)





The difference between LCCs and ULCCs is relative

- tend to incorporate the majority of LCC features
- rely on traffic stimulation more than market steal
- max number of a la carte services
- do not offer 'frills' if they add to costs

Marketing tool of self-promotion

•("Ryan Air – Europe's only ULCC")

József Váradi distinguishes between ULCCs, a category in which he places Wizz Air, and LLCCs, lazy-low-cost carriers, that have lost their original focus and are "diverting from the basic fundamentals of being really low-cost".



ULCCs

ULCCs differ from LCCs :


Rely on traffic stimulation more than market steal

High proportions of ancillary revenues

Do not offer 'frills', even if they enhance revenues, if the frill adds to costs.

ULCCs have power to shift passenger travel and airport usage patterns to much greater degree than traditional LCCs.

The ULCC business model is based strictly around low fares, which requires low costs.



Realizing the vision together

Ancillary services are an important source of revenue for ULCCs



Ancillary revenue = revenue from non-ticket sources

Charging for everything: blankets, entertainment, beverages, food, priority boarding, credit card handling fee (!) etc.

Becoming a major source of revenue for LC, LCC and ULCC – 43.8% increase world wide to \$32.5b in 2011


United \$1,527m, Qantas \$783m, Ryanair \$663m, Air Canada \$534m (2009)

ULCCs and ancillary revenue



Top 10 Airlines – ancillary revenue as % of total revenue:

Rank	Percentage of total	Airline
1	29.2%	Allegiant
2	23.9%	Spirit Airlines
3	22.2%	Ryanair
4	19.4%	EasyJet
5	19.4%	Tiger Airways
6	18.1%	Jet2.com
7	14.4%	Aer Lingus
8	13.3%	Alaska Airlines
9	13.2%	FlyBe
10	13.1%	AirAsia



ULCC at a glance: Allegiant Air

•Founded in 1997

•Based in Las Vegas (focus cities in Florida and Phoenix)

•A travel company (hotels, car rentals, show tickets distribution)

 Route network has minimal overlap with LCCs

•Profitable (EBITDA 16.4% in 2011)


Low debt ratio







Allegiant's focus is on leisure markets



Route map as of February 2012



Allegiant's business model



Fleet

•51 MD-80

•1 B757-200 (5 more on order)

Costs

·Low aircraft ownership costs

•Simple IT systems (no connecting flights)

Uses low cost airports

No dedicated counters at airports

Product

•No frills service at a low price

•Canadian traffic at US airports (e.g. Bellingham and Plattsburgh)

•\$133 BLI-LAS versus \$274 YVR-LAS with Air Canada

ULCCs



Europe

Ryanair, Wizz Air, Aer Lingus

•(Michael O'Leary "Ryanair is the only ULCC")

North America

•Spirit Airlines, Allegiant Air


Canada

no ULCCs presently

•Rouge will not be ULCC according to AC's CEO.


•"Is it ultra-low cost à la other low-cost carriers elsewhere in the world? You know, that was not necessarily achievable within the context of our unionized environment."

A newer fleet explains part of Ryanair's cost gap, but the largest gap still exists for product and distribution costs




Source: IATA Airline Cost Performance Economics Briefing, March 2007.

Ryanair – pursuit to reduce its operational costs



Ancillary revenues significantly contributes to revenues and profitability of low cost carriers

- Ancillary services can bring substantial revenues
- But to generate them requires complex marketing and sales effort
- Passengers want to save with LCCs, instead of spending



Source: Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation

InterVIST/

Regional carriers

Beech

•19 seats 1.5-2 hours

Dash 8

•37-74 seats 2+ hours

CRJ/ERJ

•50-90 seats 3 hours

Embraer

•70-180 seats 4 hours








Canada & Europe: important industry players

- U.S. & Asia: not common
- Seasonal niche opportunities (35% of summer Europe are Charters)
- Commonly 1- 4 freq/wk. Maximize aircraft utilization
- Varies significantly from year to year
- Often affiliated with tour operators (i.e. Canadian Affairs)
- Canada: Zoom, Air Transat, Skywings
- **Europe: Thomas Cook, LTU, MyTravel**


Charter carriers in Europe



The growth in individual (seat only) travel has had a significant impact on the traditional charter market




Passengers at Spanish airports (1990-2006)



- In Spain the charter market peaked in 1994 and has declined by 25% in 12 years
- In the same period the total market has trebled, with scheduled carriers growing four fold.
- Much of the scheduled growth since 2002 has been with Low Cost Carriers

Example Decline of UK charter airlines




Non-scheduled passengers carried by key UK airlines

Circa 100 charter airlines in Europe, with over half of all charter aircraft operated by carriers from the UK, Germany or Turkey (2008)




Number of aircraft over 50 seats operated by charter carriers



Note: Europe includes EU27, plus Croatia, Iceland Norway, Switzerland and Turkey

Growth of seat-only market to try to compensate decline of the traditional package tour market




Source: UK CAA


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Unit costs of charter carriers

Adjusted unit cost (@ 800 km, eurocent)




Handling Charge Per Passenger €, 2006/07




Realizing the vision together



.Profitability of Charter Carriers





InterVISTAS

Charter operators must extract higher prices in the market to survive.






Hybrid models develop as airlines move away from 'pure' legacy or low cost models.

Airline business models are converging towards one another as:

•Legacy carriers face increased pressure to lower costs, cut on 'frills', charge for 'ancillaries', renegotiate labour contracts, etc.


Low cost carriers look for new markets and expansion opportunities

A newer fleet explains part of Ryanair's cost gap, but the largest gap still exists for product and distribution costs




Source: IATA Airline Cost Performance Economics Briefing, March 2007.

Ryanair – pursuit to reduce its operational costs




Are we seeing the evolutionary business model in action and changing the industry ?



In US legacy carriers started closing the gap from mid 2000's



Labor Costs per ASM *CY 2000 & CY 2005*



US carriers have been successful in reducing their distribution costs taking advantage of lower cost distribution channels




Continental increased internet sales from 5% of total to nearly 50% of total between 2000 and 2005


 Hawaiian went from around 3% to 50% as well

Airlines have brought their costs down by:

- Redirecting customers to direct channels
 - . On to websites and away from agents
 - . B2B
 - . On line agencies
- Renegotiating contracts with GDS providers
- Increasing e-ticket use
- Significant reduction in ATO



US Airline Distribution Costs as a Share of Operating Revenue 1999 vs. YE2Q06



Emulate lessons from the success of Low Cost Carriers




- Divestiture of business units airline MRO etc and provide focus on that with holding company
- Privatisation, formation of new labour contracts in business friendly environment with hire and fire and performance based compensation
- Delayer and rationalise the business: most airlines can achieve that by leveraging growth
- Intelligent use of front office back office strategies to maintain focus and synergies across back office
- Creation of focused airlines with front office specialisation and back office synergies Network focus on variable contribution and restructuring
 - Focus assets on few destinations (concentrate fewer destinations and dominate the city pair
 - Eliminate tag flights, two stop one stop routes
 - Day of week, time of day and convenience of the schedule
 - Hub Optimisation improve flight connection either side of the banks
 - Use of professional modelling tools and develop scheduling skills

Depeaking is reducing costs through squeezing out the embedded unproductive time within a 'bank', while crews wait for baggage to travel


CLIENT EXAMPLE

Baggage Handling: Workload vs. Staffing Requirement *(Within A Turnaround)*



Continuous scheduling eliminates a lot of the underlying complexity

Rising revenues also helped US network carriers improve operating profitability




Adjusted Revenue per ASK


1/ American, Delta, United.


Source: IATA Airline Cost Performance Economics Briefing, March 2007.


Full service carriers have implemented some of LCC's practices into their business model to improve efficiency











Source lufthansa systems

Dedicated Hamburg Operations profits from using LCC Structures

Aspects of Lufthansa Hamburg

Dedicated 737 Fleet

- O Autonomous MRO Teams with fix Members
- Or Point to point Operation of Aircrafts
- O Nightstop Rate 100% in Hamburg
- Dedicated Flight Crews

- Easy and reliable Prediction of available Capacity
- Optimized Maintenance Planning
- ➡ Effective Reaction on Disturbances



Measurable Benefits

➔ Ground Time at Airports:	30 min avg.
	5 per day
→ Air - Ground Ratio:	7:1

Realizing the vision together

InterVISTAS

Source lufthansa systems

European network airlines are able to achieve a much higher revenue premium over LCC competitors on short-haul markets than their counterparts in the US



16 Revenue per ASK (2005 € cents) 14 12 38% 10 -35% 8 -53% 46% 6 Network Airlines¹ 4 EasyJet 2 Ryanair 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005


Adjusted Revenue per ASK

1/ Air France, British Airways, Lufthansa.

Source: IATA Airline Cost Performance Economics Briefing, March 2007.

LCCs have targeted longer haul markets for expansion:


they operate 65% of their domestic capacity in markets over 500 mi.



LCCs -WN, JetBlue, HP, Airtran, ATA, Frontier

Sources: US DOT O&D Database, via Database Products Hub Supplement Database

Low-cost carriers increasingly resemble hub & spoke systems, in InterVISTAS addition to expanding their previously limited international offerings



InterVISTAS	

Southwest Airlines in 2000	
Number of Aircraft in Fleet	326
Percent of Markets Under 2 Hrs	83.9%
Avg No. of Daily Flights per Market	4.4
Average Stage Length	470
Code-Share Agreements	None

Southwest Airlines in 2005	
Number of Aircraft in Fleet	412
Percent of Markets Under 2 Hrs	76.5%
Avg No. of Daily Flights per Market	4.1
Average Stage Length	584
Code-Share Agreements	ΑΤΑ





Future trends in airline business models – cont.



Legacy carriers introduce low cost subsidiaries

- •Air Canada Rouge
- •Qantas Jetstar
- Lufthansa Germanwings









Thank You!

www.intervistas.com